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INTRODUCTION 
“[I]ntellectual property laws and the antitrust laws share [a] common 
purpose[] of promoting innovation and enhancing consumer welfare.”1  
Patent laws grant exclusive rights to inventors in exchange for the 
disclosure of their creations into mainstream society.2  On the other 
hand, antitrust laws allow for reasonable consumer access to such 
discoveries by preventing inventors from unfairly exploiting their 
creations.3  Although patent and antitrust laws promote similar goals, 
they do so in contention with each other.  “Because a patent is a special 
grant of power to exclude competition, and exclusionary power has 
historically been scrutinized strictly under the antitrust laws, the patent 
and antitrust laws have historically coexisted in tension with one 
another.”4  “[T]here is tension between the patent and the antitrust laws 
that flows naturally from the need for courts and the antitrust 
enforcement agencies to determine the circumstances in which the 
principles underlying one body of law will prevail over those of the 
other.”5 
The balancing act described above is exactly what occurs at the 
International Trade Commission (ITC) when it reviews § 337 claims.  
The ITC has two functions under § 337: (1) to protect domestic industry 
and (2) to enforce domestic patents.6  Respondents subject to § 337 
claims likely will assert that the patent is invalid, turning to patent law, 
or that the patent is misused, relying on antitrust to justify its behavior.7  
In some cases where the latter is asserted, the ITC is forced to make a 
choice between protecting domestic industry and enforcing a domestic 
patent.  The assertion of a patent misuse defense also presents 
interesting issues on appeal, especially those decisions appealed to the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.  The Federal Circuit’s 
jurisdiction and expertise is based in patent law, which leads to the 
 
1.  4 VON KALINOWSKI ET AL., ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 
72.02[4] (Matthew Bender 2d ed. 2010) (quoting 1995 Intellectual Property Guidelines § 1).  
See also SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1203 (2d Cir. 1981). 
2.  SCM v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1203 (2d Cir. 1981).  
3.  See id. 
4.  SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, AM. BAR ASSOC., THE ANTITRUST 
COUNTERATTACK IN PATENT INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION 47 (1994). 
5.  VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 1. 
6.  See Sapna Kumar, The Other Patent Agency: Congressional Regulation of the ITC, 
61 FLA. L. REV. 529, 547–48 (2009).  
7.  See e.g., C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (In a 
non-§ 337 context, alleged infringer argued that patent was invalid, or that antitrust justified 
infringing actions). 
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question of how antitrust issues are handled within our highest patent 
court. 
This Comment, then, addresses the tensions faced by the Federal 
Circuit in reviewing the ITC’s patent misuse decisions that address § 337 
claims.  Patent misuse is the only antitrust-related doctrine that the 
Federal Circuit court has addressed in a § 337 appeal.  There are two 
types of patent misuse: per se misuse and the rule of reason misuse. 
First, this Comment provides relevant background information by 
explaining § 337 itself, the administrative power and function of the ITC 
under § 337, and the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction and deferential stance 
to the ITC regarding § 337 appeals.  Subsequently, this Comment 
examines both per se and rule of reason patent misuse defenses, within 
the context of ITC appeals to the Federal Circuit of § 337 claims, by 
laying out their doctrinal frameworks as set out by the Federal Circuit in 
U.S. Phillips Corp. v. ITC.8  With the preface that patent misuse 
jurisprudence is rather limited within the spectrum of ITC cases 
appealed to the Federal Circuit under § 337, this Comment analyzes the 
Federal Circuit’s treatment of patent misuse defenses by considering the 
court’s holdings in U.S. Phillips Corp.  This analysis finds that while the 
Federal Circuit’s result in Phillips was well reasoned, the test set out for 
patent misuse under the rule of reason is problematic under the § 337 
framework.  The rule of reason test balances procompetitive benefits 
against anticompetitive effects, focusing solely on antitrust; § 337 is a 
patent-antitrust statute and defenses asserted under it should be 
evaluated by both patent and antitrust policy.  This problem does not 
arise within the per se patent misuse doctrine.  There, Congress has 
already considered the patent and antitrust justifications and decided 
what specific circumstances the doctrine encapsulates.  Accordingly, this 
Comment proposes that patent misuse analysis, under the rule of reason 
doctrine and in the context of § 337 appeals, should involve a mixed test 
that will balance patent and antitrust policy, in order to keep both 
considerations in sight. 
I.  SECTION 337, THE ITC, AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 
This part of the Comment will discuss § 337 by examining (1) the 
statute, the capacity, and function of its governing agency; (2) the ITC 
under § 337; and (3) the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit to hear 
appeals regarding § 337 matters from ITC final decisions. 
 
8.  424 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
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A.  What is Section 337? 
Section 337 of the Tariff act of 1930, as amended, is the authorizing 
statute of the ITC.  It gives the agency the power “to conduct 
investigations into allegations of unfair practices in import trade”9 that 
adversely affect the U.S. economy.  The statute makes unlawful 
“[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation of 
articles . . . into the United States, or in the sale of such articles by the 
owner, importer or consignee, the threat or effect of which is (i) to 
destroy or substantially injure an industry in the United States . . . .”10  
Section 337 also deems that it is illegal to import into “the United 
States, the sale for importation, or the sale within the United States 
after importation by the owner, importer, or consignee, of articles that 
(i) infringe a valid and enforceable United States patent . . . .”11  To 
bring a patent infringement complaint before the ITC under § 337, 
“there [must] be importation of infringing articles. . . . [and] the 
complainant [must] demonstrate that a domestic industry in articles 
practicing a claim of the patent in suit ‘exists or is in the process of being 
established.’”12  Although this Comment focuses on patent litigation, § 
337 also protects other intellectual property rights such as copyrights 
and trademarks.13 
B.  Section 337: The International Trade Commission and Patent 
Litigation 
Section 337 provides two initial requirements for patent complaints: 
(1) the establishment of domestic industry and (2) jurisdiction.  As 
mentioned above, the domestic industry element is satisfied by showing 
that a domestic industry exists or is in the process of being established, 
which is related to the articles protected by the patent.14  The domestic 
industry requirement is then furthered divided into two prongs, one 
where the ITC reviews technical considerations and another where they 
consider economic considerations.15  A complainant satisfies the 
technical prong by showing that “it or its licensees or ‘practices at least 
 
9.  G. Brian Busey, An Introduction to Section 337 and the U.S. International Trade 
Commission, in PATENT LITIGATION 2008 3 (PLI 2008). 
10.  19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(A) (1988) (amended 2009). 
11.  19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i). 
12.  Busey, supra note 9, at 7 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(2)). 
13.  19 U.S.C. §§ 1337(a)(1)(B)(i), (a)(1)(C) (1988) (amended 2009). 
14.  Supra Part I.A.  See also 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(A)(i)–(iii).   
15.  Kumar, supra note 6, at 534 (citing In re Male Prophylactic Devices, USITC Inv. 
No. 337-TA-546, 2007 ITC LEXIS 860, at *60 (Aug. 1, 2007)). 
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one claim of the asserted patents[.]’”16  The economic prong is satisfied 
by a showing of “domestic activities, with respect to the patent or 
patented article, that involve: (A) significant investment in plant and 
equipment; (B) significant employment of labor or capital; or (C) 
substantial investment in [its] exploitation, including engineering, 
research and development, or licensing.”17  Whether the prongs are met 
is a subjective determination by the ITC;18 however, these initial 
requirements are usually easy to meet.19 
The jurisdiction element of the initial requirements is generally also 
easily met.  In a potential proceeding, the ITC will exercise in rem 
jurisdiction over the allegedly infringing product.20  Accordingly, the 
ITC does not need personal jurisdiction over the manufacturers or 
importers of the product, which provides an easy way to gain 
jurisdiction in matters that involve foreign defendants.21  Despite the 
way in which jurisdiction attaches, the manufacturers or importers are 
not foreclosed from participating in the proceedings.  These parties are 
“given [the] opportunity to participate in the proceeding . . . [and] may 
raise any equitable or legal defense, such as patent invalidity.”22 
Once the initial requirements are deemed satisfied within a 
complaint, “the ITC [] decide[s] if action is merited.  If [the ITC] 
chooses to proceed, it will open an investigation.”23  After the 
investigation is opened, it will be assigned to one of six ALJs 
[Administrative Law Judges], that ALJ will then conduct an evidentiary 
hearing.24  Also at this point, “the ITC’s office of Unfair Import 
Investigations assigns a staff attorney to represent the public interest [in 
the case], and the attorney will serve as an [active] party in the 
investigation. . . . The attorney . . . can influence the outcome of the 
 
16.  Id. (alterations in original). 
17.  See id. (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(3) (1988) (amended (2006)). 
18.  See id. at 535. 
19.  See generally id. 
20.  Kumar, supra note 6 at 535. 
21.  See id. at 535. 
22.  See id. (citing Walter J. Blenko, When Does Patent Infringement Become Unfair 
Competition?, JOM, Oct. 1990, at 55, available at 
http://www.tms.org/pubs/journals/JOM/matters/matters-9010.html and 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) 
(2006)). 
23.  See id. at 536; 19 C.F.R. § 210.58 (2008).  (This stipulates a 35-day waiting period 
during where the ITC reviews the complaint for sufficiency.  The waiting period may be 
extended by the agency or at the request of a party). 
24.  Kumar, supra note 6, at 536 (citing U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, SECTION 337 
INVESTIGATIONS: ANSWERS TO FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 2 (2004)). 
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case.”25  A short discovery period will follow, and “[t]ypically after six or 
seven months, the ALJ will hold a formal evidentiary hearing[.]”26  The 
evidentiary hearing will result in an Initial Determination, “which is 
certified to the ITC with the evidentiary record.”27  “The decision then 
automatically goes up to the ITC’s six-member Commission, who have 
the option to decline review . . . (allowing it to become final), review and 
adopt it, modify it, or reverse it.”28  “The Commission’s order [will go] 
into effect after sixty days, except [for] the rare event that the President 
disapproves of [the order] on policy grounds under § 3379(j).”29  This 
entire proceeding will move rather quickly; most § 337 investigations are 
completed within fifteen months.30 
Prevailing complainants in § 337 litigation generally receive some 
form of exclusion order.31  Exclusion orders may be limited or general.32  
“Limited exclusion orders instruct the U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection (Customs) [agency] to exclude from entry all articles that are 
covered by the patent at issue and that originate from a named 
respondent in the investigation.”33  General exclusion orders, in contrast 
direct Customs “to exclude all infringing articles, without regard to 
source.”34  An additional penalty the ITC may grant is an exclusion 
order covering downstream products.35  Downstream products are those 
 
25.  See id. (citing Russell E. Levine, The Benefits of Using the ITC, MANAGING 
INTELL. PROP. 25, 27 (Sept. 2004)). 
26.  Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 556(b)(3) (2006)). 
27.  Id. (citing U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, SECTION 337 INVESTIGATIONS: ANSWERS 
TO FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 2 (2004)). 
28.  Id. at 537 (citing U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, SECTION 337 INVESTIGATIONS: 
ANSWERS TO FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 21 (2004), available at 
http://www.usitc.gov/trade_remedy/int_prop/pub3708.pdf). 
29.  Kumar, supra note 6, at 537 (citing Press Release, Broadcom Corp., Broadcom 
Urges Administration Orders to Let ITC Patent Action Stand (July 5, 2007), available at 
http://www.broadcom.com/press/release.php?id=1023034). 
30.  See Busey, supra note 9, at 15 (citing a target completion date of 15 months).  See 
also Kumar supra note 6, at 537 ((citing U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, PERFORMANCE AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2007 70, available at 
http://www.usitc.gov/ext_relations/about_itc/USITC_PAR_2007.pdf (citing 17-month 
completion dates). 
31.  See Kumar, supra note 6, at 537 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1) (2006)). 
32.  Id. 
33.  Id. at 537–38 (citing U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, SECTION 337 INVESTIGATIONS: 
ANSWERS TO FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 22 (2004), available at 
http://www.usitc.gov/trade_remedy/int_prop/pub3708.pdf)).  
34.  Id. at 538 (citing U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, SECTION 337 INVESTIGATIONS: 
ANSWERS TO FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 22 (2004), available at 
http://www.usitc.gov/trade_remedy/int_prop/pub3708.pdf. 
35.  See Busey, supra note 9, at 22. 
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that contain the infringing product as a component.36  The ITC applies a 
balancing test to determine whether the inclusion of a downstream 
product is proper; this test “weighs the complainant’s interest in 
obtaining complete relief against the possible disruption of legitimate 
trade of products that were not themselves found to violate 
Section 337.”37  The ITC must consider the policy implications of an 
exclusion order before it issues one. 
 
The ITC can decline to issue an exclusion order, or 
can narrow it, if after considering the effect of such 
exclusion order, or can narrow it, if “after considering 
the effect of such exclusion upon the public health and 
welfare, competitive conditions in the United States 
economy, the production of like or directly competitive 
articles in the United States, and United States 
consumers, [the ITC] finds that such articles should not 
be excluded from entry” or such an order should not be 
issued.38 
 
Lastly, the ITC also has the option of “issu[ing] a cease-and-desist 
order in addition to or in place of an exclusion order.”39  These orders 
prevent those found violating the statute from engaging in unfair 
methods, or acts,40 namely “selling ‘commercially significant’ domestic 
inventories of infringing goods.”41 
C.  Section 337 Appeals and the Federal Circuit 
Pursuant to § 337(c), “Any person adversely affected by a final 
determination of the Commission . . . may appeal such determination, 
within 60 days after the determination becomes final, to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.”  The Federal Circuit 
reviews legal determinations of the ITC de novo.42  This means the court 
reviews the legal conclusion without deference, while “review[ing] the 
 
36.  Id. 
37.  Id. 
38.  Kumar, supra note 6, at 538 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (d)(1)). 
39.  Id. (citing Fuji Photo Film Co. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 386 F.3d 1095, 1107 
(Fed. Cir. 2007); 19 U.S.C. § 1337(f)(1)).  
40.  19 U.S.C. § 1337(f)(1) (2009).  
41.  Kumar, supra note 6, at 538 (citing Fuji Photo Film Co. 386 F.3d 1095, 1107 (Fed. 
Cir. 2007)). 
42.  Checkpoint Sys., Inc., v. ITC, 54 F.3d 756, 760 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).   
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factual findings of the Commission under the substantial evidence 
standard.”43  However, the Federal Circuit must give ITC some 
deference in certain situations.  The Federal Circuit has held that the 
ITC is entitled to a certain amount of deference to the extent that it is 
interpreting its own statute that it is administering.44 
II. PATENT MISUSE IN SECTION 337 APPEALS 
This Section of the Comment examines case law regarding the 
patent misuse defense within § 337 appeals.  The Federal Circuit’s most 
recent and settled case on this topic, U.S. Phillips v. ITC,45 will be used 
to facilitate the discussion as to what the present patent misuse 
doctrines are within the context of § 337 appeals.  Part A will lay out the 
basic framework of the patent misuse doctrine.  The basic framework 
will be followed by a discussion of the two types of patent misuse.  Per 
se patent misuse will be explained in Part B, followed by patent misuse 
under the rule of reason in Part C. 
A.  Patent Misuse 
“Patent misuse is an equitable defense to patent infringement.”46  In 
U.S. Phillips, Princo Corporation and Princo America (hereinafter 
referred to as Princo collectively), the respondents, asserted the patent 
misuse defense against U.S. Phillips, asserting that they could not be 
liable for importing products that infringed several of U.S. Phillips’ 
patents because the patents were being used in an anticompetitive 
manner.47 
 
 
43.  Bourdeau Bros., Inc. v. ITC, 444 F.3d 1317, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
44.  See Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. ITC, 545 F.3d 1340, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2008).  There, 
the court stated the following: 
 
This court conducts statutory interpretations in accordance with the framework established 
by Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  Under 
Chevron, “a reviewing court must first ask ‘whether Congress has directly spoken to the 
precise question at issue.’”  FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 
(2000) (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., 467 U.S. at 842).  “If Congress has done so, the inquiry is at 
an end; the court ‘must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.’”  
However, if “the statute in question is ambiguous and the agency’s interpretation is 
reasonable,” “a court must defer to an agency's construction of a statute governing agency 
conduct.” Cathedral Candle Co. v. ITC, 400 F.3d 1352, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2005).   
 
45. 424 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
46.  Id. at 1184. 
47.  See id. at 1183–84. 
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The purpose of the patent misuse defense “[is to] 
prevent a patentee from using the patent to obtain 
market benefit beyond that which inheres in the 
statutory patent right.”48  As the Supreme Court has 
explained, the doctrine of patent misuse bars a patentee 
from using the ‘patent’s leverage’ to “extend the 
monopoly of his patent to derive a benefit not 
attributable to the use of the patent’s teachings,” such as 
requiring a licensee to pay a royalty on products that do 
not use the teaching of the patent.49  The “key inquiry is 
whether, by imposing conditions that derive their force 
from the patent, the patentee has impermissibly 
broadened the scope of the patent grant with 
anticompetitive effect.”50 
 
In U.S. Phillips, “Phillips own[ed] patents to technology for 
manufacturing recordable compact discs (CD-Rs) and rewritable 
compact discs (CD-RWs) that it licensed only through package 
licenses.”51  There were several options as to the group of patents one 
could license; within the licensing options were groupings that were 
essential and nonessential to producing compact disc compliant with 
certain technical standards.52  Princo asserted that this practice 
amounted to patent misuse because: 
 
Phillips [was] improperly forc[ing] them, as a 
condition of licensing patents that were necessary to 
manufacture CD-Rs or CD-RWs, to take licenses to 
other patents that were not necessary to manufacture 
those products.  In particular Princo argued that a 
number of the patents included in the category of 
‘essential’ patents were actually not essential for 
manufacturing compact discs.53 
 
48.  Id. at 1184 (citing Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 704 (Fed. Cir. 
1992)). 
49.  U.S. Phillips Corp. v. I.T.C., 424 F.3d 1179, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Zenith 
Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Res., Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 135–36 (1969)). 
50.  Id. at 1184–85 (citing C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998)); Windsurfing Int’l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).  
51.  Id. at 1182. 
52.  See id. at 1182. 
53.  U.S. Phillips Corp. v. ITC, 424 F.3d 1179, 1183 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
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The ALJ, at the ITC, concluded that Princo had infringed various 
claims of Phillips’ patents covering the CD-R and CD-RW 
technologies.54  However, the ALJ also found that Phillips’ “patents 
were unenforceable by reason of patent misuse”;55 more specifically the 
judge held that “the package licensing arrangements constituted tying 
arrangements that were illegal under analogous antitrust law principles 
and thus rendered the subject patents unenforceable.”56  Phillips 
petitioned the ITC for review, and “[t]he Commission ruled that 
Phillips’s patent packaging licensing arrangement constituted per se 
patent misuse because Phillips did not give prospective licensees the 
option of licensing individual patents . . . rather than licensing one or 
more of the patent packages as a whole.”57  In the alternative, “the 
Commission [held] that even if Phillips’s patent package licensing 
practice was not per se patent misuse, it constituted patent misuse under 
the rule of reason.”58  The Commission reasoned “the anticompetitive 
effects of including nonessential patents in the packages of so-called 
essential patents outweighed the procompetitive effects of that 
practice.”59 
In reversing the ITC, the Federal Circuit proceeded through the per 
se and rule of reason patent misuse doctrines, explaining why Phillips’ 
patent packaging practice did not amount to either form of patent 
misuse. 
B.  Per Se Patent Misuse 
A certain specific act must be committed in order to come under the 
per se patent misuse doctrine.60 
 
[P]ractices . . . identified as constituting per se patent 
misuse, ‘include[] . . . ‘tying’ arrangements in which a 
patentee conditions a license under the patent on the 
purchase of a separable, staple good, and arrangements 
in which a patentee effectively extends the term of its 
 
54.  Id. 
55.  Id. 
56.  Id. 
57.  Id. at 1184. 
58.  U.S. Phillips Corp. v. ITC, 424 F.3d 1179, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
59.  Id. 
60.  Id. at 1185 (“The court noted that certain specific practices have been identified as 
constituting per se patent misuse . . . .”) 
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patent by requiring post-expiration royalties.61 
 
“In 35 U.S.C. § 271(d), Congress designated several specific 
practices that do not constitute patent misuse.  [These] include 
“condition[ing] the license of any rights to the patent or the sale of the 
patented product on the acquisition of a license to rights in another 
patent or purchase of a separate product.”62  However, these practices 
become patent misuse if “the patent owner ‘has market power for the 
patent or patented product on which the license or sale is 
conditioned.’”63  The Federal Circuit gives this provision a narrow 
reading, finding it to “exclude[] such conditional licenses in which the 
patent owner lacks market power from the category of arrangements 
that may be found to constitute patent misuse.”64  “If [a] particular 
licensing arrangement . . .  [does not fit within] one of those specific 
[enumerated] practices, . . . it will be analyzed under the rule of 
reason.”65 
In Phillips, the court held that Phillips had market power in the 
relevant market; and therefore, it could not find refuge in § 271(d)(5).66  
Despite this, the Federal Circuit ultimately held that Phillips’ patent 
packaging practice did not meet the threshold of per se patent misuse.67  
The court reasoned that Phillips’ practice differed vastly from a tying 
arrangement, where the “patent owner uses the market power conferred 
by the patent to compel customers to purchase a product in a separate 
market . . . .”68  In Phillips, the situation differed because “a package 
licensing agreement that includes both essential and nonessential 
patents does not impose any requirement on the licensee;” the customer 
is not compelled to use the patentee’s technology.69  Also, the court 
found that the inclusion of nonessential patents within a licensing 
package could not be inferred to increase the price of the package.70  “A 
patent that is nonessential because it covers technology that can be fully 
 
61.  Id. at 1185 (citing Virginia Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 868–69 
(Fed. Cir. 1997). 
62.  U.S. Phillips Corp. v. ITC, 424 F.3d. 1179, 1186 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
63.  Id. at 1186 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5)). 
64.  See id. 
65.   Id. at 1185. 
66.  U.S. Phillips Corp. v. ITC, 424 F.3d 1179, 1186 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
67.  Id. at 1197. 
68.  See id. at 1189 (citing United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 400 (1948)). 
69.  Id. at 1190. 
70.  Id. at 1191. 
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replaced by alternative technology that is available for free is essentially 
valueless;”71 thus, their inclusion cannot reasonably have an impact on 
the overall package cost and presumably do not create an incentive to 
buy the essential patents separately. 
Finding that Phillips’ conduct could not be conclusively presumed to 
be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry, the 
court turned to rule of reason analysis. 
C.  Patent Misuse Under the Rule of Reason 
[Under the rule of reason,] “the finder of fact must 
decide whether the questioned practice imposes an 
unreasonable restraint on competition, taking into 
account a variety of factors, including specific 
information about the relevant business, its condition 
before and after the restraint was imposed, and the 
restraint’s history, nature and effect.”72 
 
To charge a patentee with patent misuse, the practice at issue must 
be within the patent grant and must broaden the scope of the patent, 
“either in terms of covered subject matter or temporality.”73  There must 
also be a finding that the potential anticompetitive effects outweigh the 
potential procompetitive effects of the behavior.74 
In Phillips, the court held that Phillips’ patent packaging practice did 
not constitute patent misuse under the rule of reason.75  The court 
reasoned that offering the nonessential patents did not amount to an 
anticompetitive effect; the patent packages did not have a negative 
impact on commercially available technology,76 and did not “[force] 
customers to purchase a product in a separate market that the customer 
might otherwise purchase from a competitor.”77  Rather, the court found 
that package licensing has procompetitive effects in that it “provides the 
parties a way of ensuring that a single licensing fee will cover all the 
patents needed to practice a particular technology.”78  The Federal 
 
71.  U.S. Phillips Corp. v. ITC, 424 F.3d 1179, 1191 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
72.  Id. at 1197 (citing Virginia Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 869 
(1997)). 
73.  Id. (citing Virginia Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 869 (1997)).  
74.  See id. at 1198. 
75.  See id. 
76.  See U.S. Philips Corp. v. ITC, 424 F.3d 1179, 1198 (Fed Cir. 2005). 
77.  Id. at 1189 (citing United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 400 (1948)). 
78.  Id. at 1193. 
SHELBOURNE - FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE) 6/20/2011  1:12 PM 
2011] BALANCING ACTS 497 
 
Circuit further found that “grouping licenses in a package allows the 
parties to price the package based on their estimate of what it is worth 
to practice a particular technology, which is typically much easier to 
calculate than determining the marginal benefit provided by a license to 
each individual patent.”79  “In short, [the court found] package licensing 
[to have many] procompetitive effect[s] [associated with] reducing the 
degree of uncertainty involved with investment decisions.”80 
III. PRESCRIPTIVE MODEL: PATENT MISUSE UNDER THE RULE OF 
REASON ANALYSIS CAN KEEP A BETTER BALANCE OF ANTITRUST 
AND PATENT POLICY WITH A MIXED TEST 
The Federal Circuit’s decision in Phillips is well reasoned and lays 
out the doctrinal framework of patent misuse under § 337 quite well.  
Analysis of the patent misuse framework set out in that decision brings 
to light several issues regarding antitrust law and how it is fairing at the 
Federal Circuit in § 337 appeals.  This Section of the Comment lays out 
those issues, particularly those that arise with the rule of reason analysis 
of patent misuse, and poses a potential solution.  Part A of this Section 
will discuss why the rule of reason analysis and not the per se doctrine of 
patent misuse causes concerns for both antitrust and patent policy 
within the context of § 337.  The primary issue is that the current 
analysis applies antitrust to patent law, which could cause the court to 
overlook patent and antitrust violations.  Part B posits that this problem 
could be resolved by using a mixed test that will promote the court to 
consider antitrust and patent violations separately. 
A.  The Problem with the Rule of Reason Analysis 
Section 337 is very much a mixed statute in that it promotes both 
patent and antitrust policies.  The doctrine foremost seeks to protect the 
monopoly of domestic patents by preventing the importation of goods 
that infringe upon them.81  The statute also promotes fair competition 
within the domestic market by eliminating unfair acts of international 
competition.82  Lastly, the application of the patent misuse doctrine 
within § 337 promotes the proper use of patents by taking away the right 
to prevent the importation of infringing products.83 
 
79.  Id. 
80.  See id. 
81.  See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i) (2009). 
82.  See generally 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2009).   
83.  See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(f)–(i)) (1994). 
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A proper patent misuse analysis, then, should take into account both 
the patent and antitrust aspects of § 337.  This goal is achieved with the 
per se patent misuse doctrine.  There, Congress has already considered 
the patent and antitrust justifications and decided what specific 
circumstances the doctrine applies to.84  However, the current function 
of the rule of reason patent misuse doctrine does not require the court 
to specifically address the patent and antitrust issues at hand. 
“[T]he rule of reason [analysis] focuses on one particular issue: the 
impact on competition, rather than all possible equitable 
considerations.”85  The test solely looks to whether the anticompetitive 
effects are outweighed by procompetitive benefits.86  Within the context 
of § 337, the doctrine applies antitrust law to patent law to discover 
whether a patent is in violation of antitrust law.  This can be detrimental 
for merited patent misuse claims because these elements are extremely 
difficult to meet,87 and as a result, a court may not find misuse in an 
action that is indeed unjustifiably anticompetitive.  Also, the application 
of antitrust to patent law is a difficult fit because of the contentious 
relationship between patent and antitrust law.88 
B.  Resolving the Rule of Reason Problem with a Mixed Analysis 
It is imperative that neither a valid antitrust or patent law claim be 
missed in a patent misuse case.  Patent misuse claims brought under § 
337 mandate this even more so because the statute functions on both 
antitrust and patent justifications; missing a policy issue on either side 
could lead to the wrong result in a case.  A mixed test for the rule of 
reason could ensure that antitrust and patent issues are both being 
considered in a patent misuse analysis. 
Under a mixed analysis, a patent misuse claim is examined 
separately for patent and antitrust violations and then weighed for 
procompetitive and anticompetitive effects.89  The separate steps ensure 
that a court has addressed both issues in arriving at its decision.90  A 
similar test has been proposed for general analysis of the patent misuse 
 
84.  See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2009). 
85.  Robin C. Feldman, The Insufficiency of Antitrust Analysis for Patent Misuse, 55 
HASTINGS L.J. 399, 422 (2003–2004). 
86.  Id. (citing PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 
100a 345–46). 
87.  See id. 
88.  See generally id. 
89.  See id. generally at 428–29. 
90.  See generally Feldman, supra note 85, at 428–29. 
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doctrine under the rule of reason.91  Adopting a mixed test for § 337 
patent misuse claims is even more so justified because of the abundance 
of patent and antitrust policies the statute seeks to promote.  
Furthermore, within the context of appeals of ITC decisions on patent 
misuse claims to the Federal Circuit, a mixed analysis will assist the 
court in allotting the correct amount of deference to the ITC’s decisions 
under § 337.  As its authorizing statute, § 337 empowers the ITC to 
make patent and antitrust determinations for which they should be 
accorded Chevron92 deference. 
CONCLUSION 
To answer the question posed earlier, examination of § 337 patent 
misuse appeals to the Federal Circuit shows that antitrust claims are 
being grouped with patent law and, at least in Phillips, losing.  A case 
involving the same players and the same technology, Princo Corp. v. 
ITC, was vacated on April 20, 2009 and remanded for a rehearing en 
banc because the Commission had not addressed all the grounds on 
which the ALJ had based his ruling.93  In Princo Corp., Princo asserted 
patent misuse as a defense to Phillips’s accusations of patent 
infringement.94 
As in Phillips,95 Princo’s argument failed.  There, the Commission 
held that the doctrine of patent misuse did not bar Phillips from 
enforcing its patent rights against Princo.96  Here, the Commission 
reasoned that even if Phillip’s blanket licensing agreement constituted a 
pooling arrangement, Princo failed to show that the pool of licensors 
would have competed in the technology absent the pooling 
arrangement.97  Also, the Commission found no showing of 
anticompetitive effect as required by the patent misuse rule of reason 
analysis.98  The Commission did not consider per se patent misuse 
because Princo’s claim did not pertain to an act which would trigger the 
per se doctrine.99 
 
91.  Id. at 429. 
92.  See supra note 45. 
93.  Princo Corp. v. ITC, 563 F.3d 1301, 1301, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
94.  Id. at 1305. 
95.  U.S. Phillips Corp. v. ITC, 424 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
96.  See id. 
97.  See Princo Corp., at 1314–15. 
98.  See id. at 1308–09.  
99.  Behaviors that trigger the per se patent misuse doctrine include: 1) tying 
arrangements in which a patentee conditions a license under the patent on the purchase of a 
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En banc, the Federal Circuit affirmed the ITC’s decision, finding 
that Phillips’s behavior did not give rise to patent misuse.100  There, the 
majority refused to extend the patent misuse doctrine to accommodate 
the argument made by Princo.101  The majority supported its opinion 
with USM Corp. v. SPS Techs., Inc.102  USM states that patent misuse 
should be reserved to circumstances where the patentee attempts to 
extend his patent grant beyond its statutory limits.103  The majority also 
suggested that antitrust law adequately addresses patent misuse 
claims.104 
Princo Corp. truly exhibits the spectrum of opinions on the patent 
misuse doctrine.  The concurring judges splintered because of their 
disagreement with “the majority’s apparent view that antitrust 
considerations are an entirely ‘different issue,’ separate and apart from 
the question of whether there has been patent misuse.”105  Instead, the 
judges found that the lines of the patent misuse doctrine should be 
drawn less narrowly than the majority suggested and less expansively 
than the dissent suggested.106  In opposition to the majority and the 
concurrence, the dissenting judges argued that the majority’s standard 
was too strict “and allow[ed] patent holders free rein to prevent the 
development of potentially competitive technologies except in the most 
extreme and unlikely circumstances.”107 
In regards to the rule of reason patent misuse doctrine, Princo 
exemplifies many of the same issues presented by Phillips.108  Both cases 
bring to light the blurriness of the rule of reason analysis and 
substantiate the argument for including a mixed test, which will ensure 
both patent and antitrust justifications are weighed.  It will be 
interesting to see how this area of the law develops, especially in a case 
 
separable, staple good, and arrangements in which a patentee effectively extends the term of 
its patent by requiring post-expiration royalties; and 2) other behaviors in which the patent 
holder uses the market power conferred by the patent to compel customers to purchase a 
product in a separate market.  U.S. Phillips Corp. v. ITC, 424 F.3d 1179, 1185 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(citing Virginia Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 868–69 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). 
100.  Princo Corp. v. ITC, 616 F.3d 1318,1321–22, (Fed. Cir. 2010).  
101.  See id. at 1329. 
102.  694 F.2d 505, 510 (7th Cir. 1982).  (There, the court stated that patent misuse “has 
largely been confined to a handful of specific practices by which the patentee seemed to be 
trying to ‘extend’ his patent grant beyond its statutory limits.”). 
103.  See id. 
104.  See Princo Corp. v. ITC, 616 F.3d 1318, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
105.  See id. at 1340 (Prost, J., concurring) (citing majority opinion at 1332). 
106.  See id. at 1340–41 (Prost, J. concurring). 
107.  See id. at 1357 (Dyk, J. dissenting). 
108.  See U.S. Phillips Corp. v. ITC, 424 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
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with new players. 
Through the guide of the Federal Circuit’s Phillips decision, this 
Comment sought to reveal that the mixed nature of § 337, grounded in 
both patent and antitrust justifications, is only further complicated by 
the patent misuse doctrine; therefore, requiring that both patent and 
antitrust policies be considered to ensure results that are consistent with 
§ 337’s aims and goals.  While the current per se patent misuse doctrine 
meets the burden of addressing both patent and antitrust justifications, 
it is not clear that the rule of reason doctrine does.  This goal would be 
better served under the rule of reason doctrine if a mixed analysis were 
used before the weighing of procompetitive and anticompetitive effects.  
A mixed test will ensure that both antitrust and patent justifications are 
considered in resolving patent misuse claims.  This is essential for patent 
misuse generally and, even more so, within the context of § 337 and § 
337 appeals to the Federal Circuit. 
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